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7th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy



July 1-3, 2013

Institut Jean Nicod, Paris

 IEC - New Ideas in Philosophy of Mind and Language


The Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy is a biennial meeting that takes place under the auspices of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ESAP) the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA), the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (SEFA), the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy (SPFA) and the Francophone Society for Analytic Philosophy (SoPhA).

The "Latin” connection is important. There are a number of affinities - intellectual, affective and geographic - among Southern European countries. The main argument in favour of this link is the fact that France, Spain, Portugal and Italy are faced with similar institutional problems, which do not affect, say, Anglo-Saxon countries. We believe academic links among Southern European countries should be reinforced, so that academic communities in those countries could raise their standing in the overall international scene. Philosophy is no exception to this and the joint organization of international conferences in the area is one obvious way of implementing the idea. Institut Jean Nicod has been playing a relevant role as far as the above-mentioned joint effort is concerned, and more so in recent years.

The purpose of the Latin Meetings (organized since 2001 in one of the Latin European countries) is to provide an opportunity for researchers (mainly) from those countries to present their work. Such research will be representative of the research in analytic philosophy carried out in the so-called Latin countries. All material presented is non-published, one main goal of the meetings being to enable researchers to present to minimally demanding audiences work-in-progress versions of articles to be submitted to international blind-refereed journals. Although this is not a necessary condition, preference is given to young researchers concluding their doctoral dissertations, and philosophers who have completed their PhD within the last 5 years. And although participation is not limited to researchers from the countries mentioned, preference will be given to researchers active in universities from those countries and to citizens of those countries working abroad.




Monday, July 1



Speaker: Alexandre Billon (Université Lile III, Institut Jean Nicod), "Self-Awareness and Pathological Self-Doubt"

Commentator: Jérome Dokic (Institut Jean Nicod)


16.30-17.00: coffee break



Speaker: Olivia Sultanescu (York University), "Is There Genuine Intentionality in Perception? An Examination of Burge's View"

Commentator: Cristina Corredor (Universidad de Valladolid)


Tuesday, July 2



Speaker: Patrizia Pedrini (Università degli Studi di Firenze), "Self-Deception: The 'Doxastic Problem'"

Commentator: Fiora Salis (Universidade de Lisboa, LANCOG)


11.30-12.00: coffee break



Speaker: Miguel Angel Sebastian (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico), "Foundations for a Metasemantic Theory of De Se Content"

Commentator: Isidora Stojanovic (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Institut Jean Nicod)


13.30-15.00: lunch break (own arrangements)



Speaker: Leandro de Brasi (Universidad Alberto Hurtado), "Contextualism Meets Testimony"

Commentator: Franck Lihoreau (Universiadade Nova de Lisboa)


16.30-17.00: coffee break



Speaker: Carlo Filotico (Milano), "Relativism and the Norms of Belief"

Commentator: Markus Kneer (Institut Jean Nicod)


20.00: conference dinner


Wednesday, July 3



Speaker: Gregory Bochner (Université Libre de Bruxelles, COGITO), "Essential Indexicality and Modal Illusions"

Commentator: François Recanati (Institut Jean Nicod)


11.30-12.00: coffee break



Speaker: Gonçalo Santos (Universidade de Lisboa, LANCOG), "Numbers and Everything"

Commentator: Can Baskent (Institut d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques).


The format of the sessions will be as follows: talk - 45 min; comments - 15 min; discussion - 30 min.



VENUE: Institut Jean Nicod, Ecolé Normale Superieure, 29 rue d'Ulm, Pavillon Jardin, 75005 Paris, sale de reunion (the building in the courtyard, ground floor).


The conference dinner on July 2 will take place at restaurant Perraudin, 157 rue Saint-Jacques, 75005 and will be subsidized.


Organizers: Dan ZemanMarkus Kneer and Vasilis Tsompanidis.


For further questions, please contact the organizers at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .


For more information, please visit http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/colloques/7th-latin-meeting-in-analytic/.


 The scientific committee of the Latin Meetings is composed of:

  • Andrea Iacona (Università dell’Aquila, Italia)
  • Célia Teixeira (LanCog, Universidade de Lisboa)
  • Elisabetta Sacchi (Università San Raffaele, Italia)
  • Jesus Vega (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)
  • Josefa Toribio (ICREA & Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona)
  • Manuel García-Carpintero (Universitat de Barcelona)
  • Manuel de Pinedo García (Universidad de Granada)
  • Massimiliano Carrara (Università di Pádua)
  • Pedro Santos (Universidade do Algarve e LanCog, Universidade de Lisboa)
  • Ricardo Santos (Universidade de Évora)
  • Stefano Caputo (Università di Torino)
  • Teresa Marques (LanCog, Universidade de Lisboa)
  • François Recanati (Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, EHESS)
  • Isidora Stojanovic (Institut Jean Nicod, Pompeu Fabra University)
  • Jerome Dokic (Institut Jean Nicod, EHES)
  • Filipe Drapeau-Vieira-Contim (University of Rennes 1)


Previous Latin Meetings:













Vicarious Representation

Institut Jean Nicod

March 12, 2012

Salle de réunion



  9.30 - 10.45: Pierre Jacob (IJN), "Vicarious Pain: Imagination, Mirroring or Perception?"

10.45 - 11.00: Coffee break

11.00 - 12.15: François Récanati (IJN), "Vicarious Mental Files"

12.15 - 14.00: Lunch break

14.00 - 15.15: Frédérique de Vignemont (IJN), "Feeling Another's Tactile Sensations"

15.15 - 15.30: Coffee break

15.30 - 16.45: Jérôme Dokic (IJN), "Subjective and Quasi De Se Imagination"

16.45 - 17.00: Coffee Break

17.00 - 18.15: Alvin Goldman (Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey), "Mindreading by Simulation: The Roles of Imagination and Mirroring"


Format: Talks will last for 45 minutes, followed by 30 minutes of discussion.


Venue: All talks will take place at Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Superieure, 29 rue d'Ulm, Pavillon Jardin, salle de réunion.


Organizers: François Récanati and Joulia Smortchkova.



Pierre Jacob, "Vicarious Pain: Imagination, Mirroring or Perception?"
Among possible vicarious experiences, I will concentrate on the experience of vicarious pain, whereby one shares another's standard pain. I will argue for an-imagination-based account of vicarious pain. Then I will critically examine two prominent rival accounts: the mirroring-based account and the perception-based account.

François Récanati, "Vicarious Mental Files"
Mental files are primarily singular terms in the language of thought : they serve to think about objects in the world. But they have a derived, metarepresentational function : they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. To account for the metarepresentational use of files I will introduce the notion of an ‘indexed file’, i.e. a file that stands, in the subject’s mind, for another subject’s file about an object. Indexed files, I will argue, are a simulative device : by deploying a mental file just like the file in the mind of the indexed person, one puts oneself in the other person’s shoes (or frame of mind), by looking at things her way. In the talk I will present the essentials of the theory and, time permitting,  I will provide an analysis of attitude ascriptions and other phenomena in terms of indexed files.

Frédérique de Vignemont, "Feeling Another's Tactile Sensations"
Through empathy, one can share another person's affective states, including pain. But what about sensory states, and in particular, tactile experiences with no affective dimension? Can they be shared? It has been recently found that some individuals report feeling touch on their own body when they see other people being touched. I shall review here several possible interpretations of this phenomenon, which is, on my view, misleadingly labelled as visuo-tactile synaesthesia. In particular, I will explore the following hypothesis:  what can be shared between self and other is not tactile experience itself, but the representation of the body that is used as reference frame for tactile experience.

Jérôme Dokic, "Subjective and Quasi De Se Imagination"
The topic of this talk is what Vendler called “subjective imagination”, which consists in imagining actions and emotions “from the inside”, as opposed to imagining them “from outside”, and what Recanati calls “quasi de se imagination”, namely the type of mental state one is in when one imagines, for instance, being Rudolf Lingens. I will put forward an analysis of subjective and quasi de se imagination within the framework of Currie and Ravenscroft’s recreative account of imagination. In particular, I shall argue that subjective imagination involves the recreation of introspective or metacognitive experiences (about our own actions and emotions). Since the relevant experiences fall short of explicit self-ascriptions, one can recreate them without recreating any explicit self-ascription. This is what makes certain forms of subjective and quasi de se imagination possible.

Alvin Goldman, "Mindreading by Simulation: The Roles of Imagination and Mirroring"
The general contours of the simulation approach to mindreading were laid down in the last twenty-five years. I will first present a sketch of the simulation view, starting with the original model -- addressed to the mindreading of propositional attitudes -- and proceeding to a later variant that addresses emotions, bodily sensations, and intentional motion.  Then I will explore more recent and novel findings that are especially pertinent to simulation theory.  Finally, I will argue that simulation theory is fully consistent with up-to-date views on the neural bases of theory of mind and evolutionary perspectives on mindreading.




"New Ideas in Philosophy of Mind and Language"

Institut d'Etude de la Cognition

Mind, Language and Metaphysics 

4th IJN-LOGOS Workshop

Institut Jean Nicod

March 19-20, 2012

Salle de réunion




Monday, March 19

10.00 - 11.10: Margherita Arcangeli (IJN), "A Proper Content for the Imagination". Comments: Gemma Celestino (LOGOS)

11.10 - 11.20: cofee break

11.30 - 12.40: Marta Campdelacreu (LOGOS), "Do we need two notions of constitution?". Comments: Alexandra Arapinis (IHPST)

12.40 - 14.00: lunch break

14.00 - 15.10: Frédérique de Vignemont (IJN), "Multimodal Bodily Experiences". Comments: Josep Macià (LOGOS)

15.10 - 15.20: coffee break

15.20 - 16.30: Stephan Torre (LOGOS), ""The Actual and the Merely Possible". Comments: Peter Hanks (University of Minnesota)

16.30 - 16.40: coffee break

16.40 - 17.50: Pierre Jacob (IJN), "A Puzzle about Belief-Ascription". Comments: Moritz Schulz (LOGOS)


Tuesday, March 20

10.00 - 11.10: Guliano Torrengo (LOGOS), "Metaphysical Explanations". Comments: Thibaut Giraud (IJN)

11.10 - 11.20: coffee break

11.20 - 12.30: Gregory Bochner (IJN), "The Transparency of Linguistic Content". Comments: Aurélien Darbellay (LOGOS)


Format: Talks will last for 40 minutes; commentaries for 10; discussion time: 20 minutes.


Venue: All talks will take place at the Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Mormale Superieure, 29 rue d'Ulm, Pavillon Jardin, salle de réunion.


Organizers: François Recanati, Dan Zeman and Marie Guillot.



Margherita Arcangeli, "A Proper Content for the Imagination"
Mental states are often classified on the basis of the type of their content, e.g. the content of perception is said to be different from the content of belief. With respect to imagination it has been maintained that considerations about mental content help us to grasp how imaginings how very strong functional similarities with other kinds of mental states. More precisely, it has been claimed that the content dimension pushes in favour of the thesis that imaginings somehow mimic non-imaginative mental states, but is useless in order to distinguish between imaginative and non-imaginative mental states. In my opinion this is true if we take into account what is explicitly represented, but this is only a narrow notion of content. Following some insights from situation theory and in particular its interpretation by Recanati, I shall argue that there are two notions of mental content: the first corresponding to what is explicitly represented, the second including in addition the appropriate situation of evaluation for the relevant explicit content. My aim is to show that, once we have the two notions of content on board, the relationship between imaginative and non-imaginative mental states can be better understood. In so doing we may also shed light on other important issues concerning imagination.

Marta Campdelacreu, "Do we need two notions of constitution?"
In this paper I present and analyse Robert Wilson’s arguments against the following traditionally held position. The relation between objects like a statue, a dollar bill or a person and the object(s) from which they are made like a piece of marble, a piece of paper or an organism, is a relation not of identity but of constitution. Moreover, there is just one relation of constitution. Wilson argues against this last point and defends that there are two different relations of constitution. In this paper I argue that Wilson’s arguments for the existence of two notions of constitution are incorrect. In my argumentation I crucially use the existence of principles of existence-persistence, which constitutionalists, Wilson among them, usually accept. I also use a slightly modified version of Lynne Rudder Baker’s theory of constitution.

Frédérique de Vignemont, "Multimodal Bodily Experiences"
One way to characterize the specific relation that we have only with our own body is to say that only our own body appears to us from the inside. By contrast, many bodies, including our own, appear to us from the outside. Although widely accepted, the distinction between the two experiential modes of presentation of the body is rarely spelled out and often reduced to the dichotomy between body senses (including senses of posture, movement, heat, pressure, balance) and external senses. Indeed, body senses give a privileged informational access to our own body that we have for no other bodies, whereas external senses can take many bodies as their object. However, the distinction between inner and outer modes of presentation of the body cannot be reduced to the distinction between inner-directed and outer-directed experiences because bodily awareness is infected by a plague of multisensory effects. Here I argue that we would not have the same type of bodily experiences if we were blind. I thus defend what I call the Multimodality thesis according to which our bodily experiences are constitutively multimodal. Without multimodality, we would experience our body differently.

Stephan Torre, "The Actual and the Merely Possible"
There are no blue swans, but there might have been. John McCain did not win the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election, but he could have. It is commonplace within the metaphysics of modality to accommodate intuitions such as these by drawing a distinction between actuality, on the one hand, and mere possibility, on the other. I consider two realist ways of drawing this distinction, Lewisian realism and Leibnizian realism, and argue that neither one succeeds in doing justice to the original modal intuitions.  I then suggest an alternative way of understanding the distinction within the realist framework and argue that it has clear advantages over the two realist views considered.

Pierre Jacob, "A Puzzle about Belief-Ascription"
(1) Much developmental evidence based on the so-called "standard false belief task" shows that when asked to predict where an agent with a false belief about an object’s location will look for it, children who know the location of the object fail until they are well into their fifth year. (2) However, several more recent experiments based on the violation-of-expectation paradigm also show that preverbal human infants are able to reliably represent an agent’s false beliefs. The puzzle is: how to reconcile (1) and (2)? Until recently there were two main strategies for solving the puzzle. One strategy is to take the data on preverbal human infants at face value and show why it is so hard for 3-year-olds to pass the standard false belief task. The other strategy is to offer low-level explanations for the data on preverbal human infants and deny that they are able to represent another’s false beliefs. Recently, a third strategy has emerged based on a so-called "two-systems" approach to belief-ascription. On behalf of the first strategy, I will argue that there is decisive evidence against the second strategy and that the third strategy cannot really get off the ground.

Giuliano Torrengo, "Metaphysical Explanations"
My topic will be the notion of explanation in philosophy and metaphysics in particular. There has been a lot of discussion about the idea of "grounding" and the understandability and usefulness of notions such as "in virtue of" or "because of", and the discussion has concerned both the methodological level and more concrete applications - such as in the case of the issue about tense realism vs tense anti-realism.

Gregory Bochner, "The Transparency of Linguistic Content"
This paper investigates the role of mental states in the determination of linguistic content through the following question: Does/should a speaker x always have transparent access to the linguistic content expressed by her use of a sentence S in a context c? More precisely, (i) does x infallibly know whether her use of S in c expressed some determinate proposition at all, and (ii) if so, is x able to infallibly discriminate which proposition was thus expressed? These questions raise (a) substantive issues about the putative dependency of linguistic content on mental content, and (b) the methodological issue, crucial to delineate semantics and pragmatics, of whether the theorist may suppose that a legitimate test in order to identify the proposition expressed by S as used by x in c is to ask x which proposition x intends/believes to express. I highlight a potential conflict between the ways in which advocates of Direct Reference and Contextualists should respectively answer such questions.




"New Ideas in Philosophy of Mind and Language"

Institut d'Etude de la Cognition 

Propositions and Propositional Attitudes

Institut Jean Nicod

April 6, 2012

Salle de réunion



10.00 - 11.15: Richard Holton (MIT), "Facts. Factives and Contra-Factives"

11.15 - 11.30: Coffee break

11.30 - 12.45: François Recanati (IJN), "Attitude Ascriptions and Opacity"

12.45 - 14.30: Lunch break

14.30 - 15.45: Peter Hanks (University of Minnesota), "First-Person Propositions"

15.45 - 16.00: Coffee break

16:00 - 17.15: Mark Richard (Harvard University), "How Must Propositions Be?"


Format: Talks will last for 45 minutes, followed by 30 minutes of discussion.


Venue: All talks will take place at Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Superieure, 29 rue d'Ulm, Pavillon Jardin, salle de réunion.


OrganizersFrançois Récanati and Marie Guillot.



Peter Hanks, "First-Person Propositions"
A first-person proposition is a proposition that is accessible to only a single subject, in the sense that only that subject can judge or assert that proposition. Many philosophers are skeptical about first-person propositions, despite the fact that they would solve problems about de se belief. Here I show how to make sense of first-person propositions without relying on first-person Fregean senses or anything else in the vicinity, such as individual essences or haecceities. The view is a development of the more general idea that propositions are types of spoken and mental actions. On this account, first-person propositions are certain types of actions we perform when we make utterances using the first-person pronoun 'I'.


Richard Holton, "Facts. Factives and Contra-Factives"

Frege begins his discussion of factives in "On Sense and Reference" with an example of a purported contra-factive, i.e. a verb that entails the falsity of the complement sentence. But the verb he cites, 'wähnen', is now obsolete, and native speakers are sceptical about whether it really was a contra-factive. Despite the profusion of factive verbs, there are no clear examples of contra-factive propositional attitude verbs in English, French or German (or indeed any other Indo-European languages). Where one would expect to find them one finds verbs that don’t take sentential complements ('refute'; 'delude'; 'mistake'; 'hallucinate') or that don’t require the falsity of the complement ('pretend'; 'wish'). One finds that one cannot even add negating prefixes to propositional attitude factives to obtain contra-factives, not even when the same prefixes can be affixed to related constructions taking NP-clauses ('proved'/'disproved'). This paper attempts to give an explanation of why there are no contra-factives, and to use this to shed light on the behaviour of factives more generally. The suggestion is that factive propositional attitude verbs take facts, not propositions, as the referents of their complement sentences; and that as there are no contra-facts (merely false propositions), there can be no contra-factives. This claim is then used to help explain Timothy Williamson’s observation that knowledge is the weakest stative propositional attitude factive.


François Recanati, "Attitude Ascriptions and Opacity"
A referential expression is (normally) used to refer, and it (normally) refers even when embedded in an attitude report. So embedded, the expression refers to what the ascribed attitude is about. Two distinct relations of reference are involved here : first, the speaker refers to what the ascribed attitude is about ; second, the attitude holder, or ‘ascribee’, is said to entertain an attitude about that object, hence to refer to it mentally. Now, as Frege pointed out, whenever something is referred to, it is referred to in a certain way -- under a certain mode of presentation. Again we have to draw a distinction between the speaker’s mode of presentation and the ascribee’s. On the standard picture, opacity arises when the way the speaker presents the object the attitude is about is meant to reflect, or to match, the ascribee’s own way of thinking of that object. I will criticize that standard picture of opacity and present a more complex picture, based on my work on mental files. On that picture, there are two distinct notions of opacity.


Mark Richard, "How Must Propositions Be?"
Some - Quine, Davidson, and their followers - are skeptical that reifying meaning or objects of attitudes has much point. But if we don't reify, we seem doomed to following Quine down the road of deeming quantifications such as 'I deny almost everything the Pope says about abortion' as 'expendable'. What must a proposition be, in order to serve this role, or other roles for which it might be needed in an account of natural language meaning or cognition? Frege and Russell thought that propositions must be, not just representations but "intrinsically representational": they represent, and that they do so is not to be explained in terms of the representational properties of other things. Others –Scott Soames is a contemporary example –think propositions are representational, but inherit their representational properties from the cognitive activity of thinkers. Yet others see no need to say that propositions are in any interesting sense representational. I defend a version of this view. A proposition is a (structured) property –e.g., a property like the property a situation has iff, were it to obtain, snow and whiteness would be such that the first has the second. As such, propositions themselves don't represent anything; people do, by believing them. I develop and critically contrast this view with other contemporary views about meaning and the attitudes.




"New Ideas in Philosophy of Mind and Language"

Institut d'Etude de la Cognition


Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Superieure

May 15, 2012



10.00-11.15: Annalisa Coliva (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), "Moore's Paradox and Commitments"

11.15-11.30: coffee break

11.30-12.45: Gianfranco Soldati (University of Fribourg), "Prospects of a Deflationary Theory of Self-Knowledge"

12.45-14.30: lunch break

14.30-15.45: Heidi Maibom (Carleton University), "Knowing Me, Knowing You!"

15.45-16.00: coffee break

16.00-17.15 François Recanati (Institut Jean Nicod), "Slow Switching and the Transparency of Coreference"


Format: Talks will last for 45 minutes, followed by 30 minutes of discussion.


Venues: the morning session will take place at 29 rue d'Ulm, Pavillon Jardin, Salle de réunion; the afternoon session will take place 29 rue d'Ulm, main building, room 235A.


Organizers: François Recanati, Dan Zeman and Jérémie Lafraire.



Annalisa Coliva, "Moore's paradox and commitments"
In this talk I review two main kinds of analysis of Moore’s paradox (either "I believe that P, but it isn’t the case that P" and "I don’t believe that P, but it is the case that P") that have been proposed in the literature so far. I call them, for convenience, the Moorean and the Wittgensteinian analysis respectively. I argue that both are defective for a number of reasons, which I present. I show how on the dominant view of belief, Moore’s paradox in fact disappears. I therefore put forward the view that Moore’s paradox can so much as exist only if its doxastic conjunct is taken to be about a very specific kind of belief, namely a belief as a commitment. Hence, the proposed analysis of Moore’s paradox indirectly supports the view I have been favoring in other writings of mine. Namely, that propositional attitudes as commitments had better be countenanced in our theorizing about the mind and that solely for these attitudes constitutive models of self-knowledge can be made sense of.

Gianfranco Soldati, "Prospects of a Deflationary Theory of Self-Knowledge"
Following a certain transparency claim, evidence concerning the external world can be used in order to ground the attribution of a belief to oneself. This epistemic privilege arguably depends on the applicability of norms of rationality that are manifest in paradoxes of the Moorean kind ('It rains but I don't believe it'). In this paper I shall try to clarify how these norms of rationality actually apply to the self-attribution of belief and I shall determine the features by virtue of which they deliver genuine epistemic warrant. A central issue in this debate, I shall argue, depends on the way experiences provide the subject with epistemic reasons to form a belief. It is useful in this respect to compare the self-attribution of judgements, of acts of judging,  with the self-attributio of other kinds of experiences, such as perceptions and desires.

Heidi Maibom, "Knowing Me, Knowing You!"
The empathic imagination is typically thought to give us information about others. By imagining how they feel or think, we get more of an insight into their psychological and emotional state. However, I shall argue that in many cases our imaginative enterprises teach us more about ourselves than they teach us about others. I shall consider a variety of ways in which we project what is true of ourselves onto others. I then consider various explanations of this tendency. It is not, I argue, because we cannot do any better that we project, but we project to protect ourselves or in other way to further projects, which may be more or less conscious. In the end, the right approach is a Freudian one.

François Recanati, "Slow Switching and the Transparency of Coreference" 
The phenomenon of "slow switching" (Burge 1988) shows that the reference (content) of a mental representation may change as the context changes even though no internally detectable change occurs. This defeats various versions of the principle of epistemic transparency. One particular version of the principle which which plays a crucial role in my theory of mental files is the transparency of coreference. According to that version of the principle, the subject who deploys the same mental file twice in a train of thought knows that, on the two deployments, the file refers to the same entity (if it refers at all). Slow switching provides an apparent counterexample, viz. a case in which, unbeknown to the subject, two deployments of the same mental file refer to two distinct entities. I will argue that the counterexample is only apparent: slow switching, I will claim, is compatible with the transparency of coreference.